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Abstract
This paper studies an urban growth model where learning through personal
contacts could be more effective in a denser locale, whereas the effectiveness of
learning through impersonal means of communications depends principally on
the technology of communications rather than on the locale in which learning
takes place. As a result of advances in communications technology, cities would
be larger, and workers would spent more time on learning through personal
contacts but may cut time on impersonal learning if the two kinds of learning
investment are complements. Otherwise, cities could become smaller, while
workers would spend more time on impersonal learning at the expense of time on
learning through personal contacts. In a multi-sector economy, urban industrial
diversity tends to increase or fall together with city size.
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1. INTRODUCTION
While internal and external increasing returns to scale in production, forward and
backward linkages, and the savings of transportation costs must all have paid impor-
tant roles for the rise and continuing prominence of the modern city, many writers
have argued that it is the role of the city as a hotbed for learning spillovers that
constitutes the city’s primary function in the service economy of the latter part of
the 20th century and the time to come.1 Indeed since Marshall (1890), economists
have emphasized how proximity fosters frequent interactions among workers — an
important ingredient for the growth and diffusion of knowledge.2
We may learn in solitude by reading books and other printed materials, and in
recent times and increasingly, by accessing information available in electronic medi-
ums. How well we learn through such impersonal means of communications probably
does not depend on where the learning takes place, but principally on the ease with
which the knowledge can be accessed as determined by the technology of commu-
nications. We may also learn through personal contacts by observing how others
perform certain tasks, by taking instructions from more experienced colleagues, and
by discussions with others sharing common interests. This paper studies an urban
growth model where the engine of growth is human capital investment through time
spent on learning as in Lucas (1988). The point of departure is that I distinguish
between learning through personal contacts and learning through impersonal means
1See for instance Chinitz (1999), Swann (1999), Leamer and Storper (2001), and Glaeser and
Kohlhase (2004).
2Noteble among recent empirical work that study the link between agglomeration and learning
include Glaeser and Maré (2001) and Audretsch and Feldman (1996). Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Hen-
derson (1992), using patent citation data, find that spillovers appear to be geographically bounded.
Thompson (2006) finds that the results of Jaffe et al. survive amidst a more rigorous identification
strategy.
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of communications. The basic hypothesis is that learning through personal contacts
could be more effective in a denser urban setting because it allows for more frequent
and varied interactions among the inhabitants, whereas the effectiveness of learning
through impersonal means of communications should not differ across locations but
is determined, by and large, by the technology of communications.
The defining difference between this paper and previous papers on urban growth,
that include for instance Eaton and Eckstein (1997), Black and Henderson (1999),
and Rossi-Hansburg andWright (2007),3 is that agglomeration in the present model is
solely for facilitating learning investment, whereas it has been conventional in dynamic
urban models to assume that the agglomeration economies are production economies
that raise the contemporaneous productivity of firms. No doubt, previous authors
recognize that the major channel through which agglomeration raises productivity
is that it facilitates various kinds of learning among the city’s inhabitants from one
another.4 The simple assumption that agglomeration helps raise static productivity
is, by all means, merely a reduced form specification of a more elaborated setting
in which the higher productivity results from various kinds of learning spillovers.
The virtue of proceeding with assuming static production externalities, instead of
starting from first principle, is that it results in a highly tractable setting to facilitate
the analysis of a multitude of questions pertaining to urban structure, growth, and
efficiency.
Nevertheless, an explicit analysis of how agglomeration helps workers learn better
in an urban growth model could in itself yield valuable insights. The modeling of
the distinction between personal and impersonal learning investments in particular
3The survey in Berliant and Wang (2004) of the literature provides an interesting perspective in
relating the literature to the tradition of neoclassical growth models.
4Durnaton and Puga (2004) survey models of the microfoundation of agglomeration economies.
Fujita and Thisse (2002, chapter 6) study an explicit model of the interactions among workers in a
city.
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provides an ideal setting to analyze the tropical question of the future of cities amidst
the vast improvements in information and communications technology (ICT) in the
recent past and the expected continuing advances in the foreseeable future. The
answer depends, rather intuitively, on the elasticity of substitution between the two
kinds of learning investment. In case the elasticity is below unity, so that the two
kinds of investment are complements, advances in communications technology that
help the worker make better use of her time on impersonal learning tend to raise
the payoff of time spent on learning through personal contacts. As a result, there
would be greater agglomeration in equilibrium. In case the elasticity is above unity,
so that the two kinds of investment are substitutes, workers would first for sure find
it optimal to raise impersonal learning investment. The increase could possibly be
partially at the expense of time on personal learning investment if the latter may be
easily substituted away. In equilibrium, cities could become smaller in size and more
numerous.
In an extension to the basic model, I turn to study how urban industrial diversity
and city size are jointly determined in a multi—sector economy. In this environment,
there can be one, two, or just any number of sectors in a city. Adding a sector to a
city has the benefit of enriching the city’s workers’ learning experiences by allowing
the city’s workers to learn from workers in that additional sector through personal
contacts. The downside is that with the city’s population spread among one more
sector, each sector included in the city would be smaller in size. Then the city’s
workers could only learn with diminished effectiveness from workers in each such
sector because of the diminished concentration of workers of the sector in the city.
In general, I find that, following advances in communications technology, if the city
becomes larger, it would also be more diversified, and vice versa.
This paper is closely related to Gasper and Glaeser (1998) in its focus on the
effects of the advances in ICT on the future of city. While Gasper and Glaeser
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restrict each agent in their model to communicate either through the “telephone” or
through personal contacts, I give workers in the present model the choice of investing
in both personal and impersonal learning investments. Further, while in Gasper and
Glaeser, whether the city would increase in size following advances in communications
technology seems to depend on the distribution of ideas among agents, my answer to
the same question hinges on the nature of the learning technology.
Urban industrial diversity has been an important topic of research. Duranton and
Puga (2000) and Abdel-Rahman and Anas (2004) survey this large literature. In ad-
dition, Duranton and Puga (2001) argue that young and innovative firms could find
the large and diversified city, because of the availability of a wide variety of intermedi-
ate inputs, an attractive place to experiment. Pascal and McCall (1980) explores the
role of path dependence in explaining why young and presumably innovative firms
would choose to follow the examples of earlier and more successful entrants to locate
in the large and diversified city. Berliant, Reed and Wang (2006) argue that interac-
tions among workers would be most useful when the knowledge possessed by a pair
of workers is not too alike or too different.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section studies the basic one—
sector model. In section 3, I extend the analysis to study the joint determination of
equilibrium urban industrial diversity and city size in the multi—sector model. Section
4 contains discussions on the role played by industrial policies as coordinating devices
and how equilibrium differs from the social optimum. Section 5 concludes. Proofs
that only involve routine calculations are omitted for brevity; the less straightforward
proofs can be found in the appendix.
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2. ANALYSIS
2.1 Preference
The economy is populated by a continuum of household—workers, each of whom
has the same preference, given by
U =
∞X
t=0
δt ln ct,
where δ < 1 is the subjective discount factor and ct the household’s consumption in
period t. Utility maximization is subject to the usual intertemporal budget constraint
that equates the household’s wealth to the present value of the household’s consump-
tion over time. Let rt be the interest rate. The household’s consumption plan then
satisfies the familiar optimal consumption growth condition
ct+1
ct
= δ [1 + rt+1] (1)
for logarithmic preferences.
2.2 The spatial structure of the city and commuting
I assume the conventional two—dimensional circular city. Housing density is as-
sumed fixed at 1, and the cost of housing development is normalized to 0. All workers
must commute to the city center for employment. In practice, both privately—supplied
inputs that include the commuter’s time, the auto, the gasoline, etc. and publicly—
supplied inputs that include the mass transit system, highways, traffic lights, and
other related public capitals are essential inputs to urban transportation. In assum-
ing that the worker spends a certain amount of time and/or uses up a certain number
of units of her own output to commute one unit distance, the typical urban model
emphasizes the roles played by privately—supplied inputs, while completely abstracts
from the roles played by publicly—supplied inputs. In this paper, I choose to focus
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on publicly—supplied inputs instead. Specifically, I assume that a worker who wishes
to commute a distance of d must purchase dα units of “urban traveling” supplied by
the public sector, for some parameter α > 0. Perhaps this setup best describes where
commuting is by public transportation. But it could apply to commuting by auto as
well, where the traveling uses some tolled highways, bridges, and tunnels.
In any case, if the transit authority charges some amount z for each unit of traveling
service rendered, and if the border of the city extends to a distance of b from the city
center, the equilibrium housing rent function becomes h (d) = z (bα − dα) , whereas
the worker’s location cost, defined as the sum of housing rent and commuting expense,
is equal to zbα. On the supply side, assume that to provide one unit of urban traveling
requires ω units of labor. In turn, to successfully hire a unit of labor, the transit
authority has to pay for the value of the worker’s outside option — the production of
the consumption good. Thus if a worker is able to produce A units of output per unit
of time spent on good production, she would be just willing to work for the transit
authority for a wage rate equal to A, and that is how much the transit authority
would pay the worker.
The two unusual elements in this setup :
1. monopoly supply of urban transportation by some transit authority,
2. non—linear commuting expense,
both seem to make the analysis more complicated than in their absence. But they do
play important roles in guaranteeing the existence of a symmetric constant growth
equilibrium under relatively simple conditions, in which the economy would not de-
generate into a single—city economy, and in which the population of each city is
stationary over time.
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2.3 Production and learning
A worker has a time—endowment of 1 in each period of time and allocates it among
learning, the production of the consumption good, and employment in the urban
transportation sector. Let At denote the worker’s productivity; i.e., output per unit
of time spent on good production. Since the transit authority would pay a wage rate
just equal to the worker’s productivity in good production, no matter how she divides
time between production and employment in the transportation sector, the worker’s
income is equal to
yt = At (1− xt)
if xt is the time spent on learning.
Suppose the worker stays in some city i. Given that the worker spends xt units
of time on learning, the worker’s productivity (human capital) is assumed to evolve
according to
At+1 = At + kitxt, (2)
where kit denotes the productivity of time spent on learning in city i. Let τ it be
the lump—sum subsidy the worker receives from staying in city i and β = 1
1+r
the
discount factor. The worker chooses xt to maximize the present value of the stream
of net income:
Vit (At) = max
xt
{At (1− xt)− zitbαit + τ it + βVit+1 (At+1)} , (3)
subject to (2), and taking as given the time paths for kit, zit, bit, and τ it. The first
order condition for an interior optimum reads
−At
kit
+ β
Ã
1− xt+1 +
At+1
kit+1
!
= 0. (4)
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2.4 Agglomeration economies — learning spillovers
Consider first how much the worker can expect to gain from time spent on learning
through impersonal means of communications. How much there is to learn and how
well a worker can learn should only depend on the quality of the learning materials
and the ease with which the materials can be accessed. If the economy’s knowledge
capital stock may be summarized by its average human capital — At, the productivity
of impersonal learning — by how much the worker’s human capital is augmented per
unit of time spent on the activity, may be most simply modeled by Atη, for some η
that measures the efficacy of the technology of communications.
Similarly, how much there is to learn through personal contacts should only depend
on what those the worker would come into contact with know — the quality of contacts
(Jovanovic and Rob (1989), Berliant et al. (2006)). Moreover, the productivity of
time spent on the activity would also depend on the number of contacts the worker
may make within a certain time period, and the worker could make many more
such contacts in a larger city (Glaeser (1999)). If the quality of contacts can be
summarized by the city’s average human capital — Ait, it is simplest to assume that
the productivity of time spent on personal learning is given by Aitf (nit), where nit is
city i’s population and f (n) some continuously differentiable function that satisfies
f 0 (n) > 0 for n ≥ 0. This formulation assumes that the city’s average human capital
is a sufficient statistic for the entire distribution of human capital in the city, and that
learning productivity is multiplicatively separable in the average quality of contacts
and a function that gives the frequency of contacts. Granted that such assumptions
are not unduly implausible, the formulation could be a useful first step to explore the
aggregative implications of how the two kinds of learning investment may interact on
the determination of equilibrium city size.
In all, by how much the worker’s human capital increases in the given period is
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assumed to be given by
∆it =
Ãh
Aitf (nit) x
P
t
i θ−1
θ +
h
Atηx
I
t
i θ−1
θ
! θ
θ−1
, (5)
where θ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between the two kinds of learning invest-
ment, and xPt and x
I
t denote, respectively, the time spent on learning through personal
interactions and impersonal means, which would add up to xt− the aggregate time
investment on learning :
xt = x
P
t + x
I
t . (6)
Maximizing (5) subject to (6) yields
xPt = xt
³
Aitf (nit)
´θ−1
³
Aitf (nit)
´θ−1
+
³
Atη
´θ−1 , (7)
xIt = xt
³
Atη
´θ−1
³
Aitf (nit)
´θ−1
+
³
Atη
´θ−1 , (8)
if the second order condition that θ < 2 is met, and where
∂xPt
∂η
>
<
0⇔ θ <
>
1. (9)
That is, the two learning technologies are complements in case θ < 1 but substitutes
otherwise.
In turn, substituting (7) and (8) into (5) yields
∆it =
µh
Aitf (nit)
i ε−1
ε +
h
Atη
i ε−1
ε
¶ ε
ε−1
xt ≡ kitxt, (10)
where
ε =
1
2− θ . (11)
In (10), kit may then be taken as the overall productivity of learning investment in
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city i. It is convenient to normalize f (0) = 1 and write5
At
³
1 + η
ε−1
ε
´ ε
ε−1 ≡ Atκ (12)
as the productivity of learning through impersonal means of communications alone.
In this case, kit starts out equal to Atκ > 0 at nit = 0, and is increasing in nit
thereafter if Ait ≥ At. Finally if Ait = At, (10) specializes to
kit = At
µ
f (nit)
ε−1
ε + η
ε−1
ε
¶ ε
ε−1
≡ Atk (nit) . (13)
Because I would just be working with the reduced form learning technology in (13)
hence, I should from now on state conditions on ε rather than on θ. This would
not cause problems in the interpretations of the conditions at all since by (11) , the
condition that ε > (<) 1 is strictly equivalent to the condition that θ > (<) 1. In
this regard, assume that
k00 (n) < 0⇔ −k (n)
1−ε
ε η
ε−1
ε
f 0 (n)2
εf (n)
+ f 00 (n) < 0, (14)
for n ≥ 0. This condition, which helps guarantee the second order conditions for max-
imization are met in the analysis to follow, is weaker than assuming strict concavity
on f (n) ; it would hold even if f 00 (n) ≥ 0, as long as ε is not too large.
2.5 The market for city
There is an unlimited number of homogenous sites in the economy where cities may
be developed. Rural land is in excess supply and therefore a free good. Following
5Alternatively, one might have considered normalizing f (0) = 0. In this case and if ε ≤ 1, kit = 0
at nit = 0. Underlying this normalization is then the presumption that, in case ε ≤ 1, personal
(as well as impersonal) learning is an essential input to human capital investment. It would be
explained in note 10 that how the existence of equilibrium cannot be guaranteed with relatively
simple conditions, and how equilibrium, given existence, can never be unique under this seemingly
more natural normalization.
11
a long tradition in urban economics, cities are assumed to form in an economywide
land market by profit—maximizing property developers (or alternatively autonomous
city governments), where each city is run by a single developer, who collects rents
and specifies urban population.6 The city developer in the present model also hires
labor to supply urban transportation service to the city’s households.
Suppose all workers in the economy start out at the same level of productivity,
equal to At say. Consider some city i. If the city’s population in period t is nit, its
border would extend to bit =
q
nit/π. Since the sum of rent and commuting charge
each household pays the city developer is equal to zitbαit, the developer’s gross revenue
is nitzitbαit = zitn
1+α/2
it /π
α/2. To earn this revenue, the developer suppliesZ bit
0
2πs1+αds =
2
2 + α
n
1+α/2
it
πα/2
units of urban transportation at a unit cost of ωAt. The developer may also choose to
subsidize each household in the city for an amount equal to τ it. In sum the developer’s
net revenue is
Πit = max{nit,zit,τ it}



µ
zit −
2ωAt
2 + α
¶
n
1+α/2
it
πα/2
− nitτ it


 , (15)
where the maximization is subject to the constraint that the households are at least
as well off as staying elsewhere in the economy. To specify this constraint, let Vt (At)
be the present value of income a worker can earn by staying in the representative
city. If in period t, the worker stays in city i, and then moves to and stays in the
representative city thereafter, the present value of income is
eVit (At) = max
xt
(
At (1− xt)− zit
µ
nit
π
¶α/2
+ τ it + βVt+1 (At+1)
)
.
The maximization in (15) is then subject to
eVit (At) ≥ Vt (At) .
6The tradition can be traced to Henderson (1974). See the survey of the literature in Abdel-
Rahman and Anas (2004).
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2.6 Symmetric constant growth equilibrium
Combining the first order conditions of (15) with respect to nit and τ it and the
zero—profit condition for city formation yields7
xk (n)1/ε−1 f (n)−1/ε f 0 (n) =
αω
2 + α
nα/2−1
πα/2
, (16)
where, without loss of generality, I have dropped the city and time subscripts. This
is the equilibrium condition for n in the symmetric constant growth equilibrium —
the equilibrium that emerges when all workers in the economy happened to start out
with the same level of productivity in some prior period. With production exhibiting
constant returns and learning displaying constant growth, there can be no transition
dynamics in the symmetric equilibrium.
The condition (16) admits a very intuitive interpretation in that it is just the first
order condition of
max
n
(
At (1− x)−
2ωAt
2 + α
nα/2
πα/2
)
(17)
subject to
At+1 = At +Atk (n)x, (18)
for some given At+1, where the maximand in (17) is output per capita net of the
resources used up in commuting. In this connection, the right side of (16) denotes the
cost of increasing agglomeration; i.e., by how much commuting expense per capita
increases per unit increase in n, normalized byAt. The left side measures the returns to
increasing agglomeration, again normalized by At; i.e., by how much current period
per capita output increases per unit increase in n, holding constant outputs in all
future periods, for which a necessary condition is that At+1 in (18) stays at the given
level.
7zit and τ it cannot be determined separately. But, given nit, together they satisfy τ it =³
zit − 2ωAt2+α
´
n
α/2
it
πα/2 by the zero—profit condition.
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The first order condition (16) is also sufficient if (17) (with x substituted out via
(18)) is strictly concave. Otherwise, the agglomerative force could dominate the
dispersion force at all levels of n to result in the entire economy collapsing into a
single city. By (14) , the left side of (16) is diminishing in n. If α > 2, the marginal
cost of agglomeration, on the right side of (16) , is strictly increasing in n, and the
second order condition is guaranteed to hold. To simplify analysis, I shall henceforth
restrict attention to where α > 2.8 Then it is straightforward to verify that there exists
a unique solution to (16) for any given x.9 Further by straightforward differentiation:
Lemma 1 An increase in η raises the marginal returns to agglomeration (the left
side of (16)) if and only if ε < 1.
To proceed, rewrite (16) as
xD (n) =
αωnα/2−1k (n)1−1/ε f (n)1/ε
(2 + α) πα/2f 0 (n)
(19)
— a monotone increasing function that starts out equal to 0 and becomes unbounded
as n becomes large. This is the inverse of a function that gives the developer’s optimal
choice of n as a function of x. Since by (16), the marginal returns to agglomeration
are increasing in x, xD (n) should only be a strictly increasing function.
To complete the characterization of equilibrium, I return to (4) , which characterizes
the time path for xt in the worker’s optimum. With kit = Atk (n), the equation
simplifies to
(1− x) k (n) = r, (20)
8Where there is linear commuting; i.e., α = 1, the marginal cost is diminishing in n. Then the
second order condition is met only if the marginal returns diminish at a faster rate. This requires
either a small ε or a rapidly diminishing f 0 (n) . For example, if f (n) = anφ, a sufficient condition
is that φ < 1/2.
9The left side is positive at n = 0 given that f 0 (0) > 0, whereas the left side is equal to 0.
Thereafter the right side increases without bound, while the left side declines.
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where r = 1−β
β
. From (1) , ct+1/ct = δ (1 + r) , and in the constant growth equilibrium,
ct+1/ct = At+1/At = 1 + k (n) x. Hence
r =
1 + k (n)x− δ
δ
. (21)
Combine (20) and (21) to obtain
xW (n) =
1
1 + δ
"
δ − 1− δ
k (n)
#
. (22)
Lemma 2 (a) xW (n) is a strictly concave and increasing function, bounded by
xW (n) <
δ
1 + δ
, (23)
and positive over n ≥ 0 if
δ ≥ 1
κ+ 1
. (24)
(b) ∂xW/∂η > 0.
The function xW (n) denotes the worker’s optimal investment in equilibrium. Where
an increase in either n or η raises learning productivity, the worker would choose a
larger x to follow.
The constant growth symmetric equilibrium with positive learning investment and
non—zero city size is a n > 0 that solves xD (n) = xW (n) . By construction, any such
equilibrium is a free—mobility equilibrium since workers earn the same discounted
lifetime income in any cities in the economy.
Proposition 1 Equilibrium with positive learning investment and non—zero city size
exists if (24) holds. In addition, if
δ ≥ 2
κ+ 2
, (25)
the equilibrium is unique.
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Fig. 1. Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
Figure 1 plots the two functions: xD (n) and xW (n) . Since xD (0) = 0 and is
increasing without bound thereafter, while xW (0) > 0 if (24) holds, and is likewise
increasing but strictly concave and bounded by (23), the two functions in figure 1
must intersect at least once. Further, the appendix shows that if (25) holds, the two
functions may intersect just once.10
2.7 City size and improvements in communications technology
Given the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, I may now move on to study
how n and x behave in equilibrium with respect to advances in the technology of
impersonal learning.
10Had we chosen to normalize f (0) = 0, and in case ε ≤ 1, κ ≡ k (0) = 0. In this case, (24) and
(25) can never be met since δ < 1. Indeed, xW (n) only becomes positive for sufficiently large n if
k (n) starts out equal to 0. Then the analysis in figure 1 suggests that, given existence, there must
be at least two equilibria, with xW strictly concave and bounded but xD unbounded.
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Proposition 2 An increase in η (a) raises equilibrium city size n if ε ≤ 1 and (b)
always results in greater learning investment x.
An increase in η exerts two kinds of influence on equilibrium city size. First, insofar
as the increase in η is an increase in learning productivity, by lemma 2, the worker
raises investment, which in turn raises the payoff to increasing agglomeration for the
developer. Equilibrium city size tends to increase as a result. Second, for a given
level of investment, by lemma 1, the marginal returns to agglomeration increase if
the two kinds of learning are complements. Thus in case ε ≤ 1, improvements in the
technology of communications unambiguously results in increasing agglomeration.
But in case ε > 1, the marginal returns to agglomeration decline at each level of
investment. If this effect dominates, there could well be declining agglomeration
in equilibrium. Even though the condition that ε ≤ 1 is a sufficient condition for
the conclusion of the proposition but not necessary, in various numerical analyzes, I
find that when the condition fails to hold, the conclusion is indeed reversed if η is
sufficiently large to begin with.
In case ε ≤ 1, the two effects of an increase in η both serve to induce the worker to
increase investment. First the increase in η raises learning productivity directly. The
equilibrium increase in n that follows raises learning productivity even further. Then
the worker must find it optimal to increase investment. In case ε > 1, the indirect
effect could be negative though since the possible decline in n tends to lower learning
productivity. A more careful analysis in the appendix establishes that the direct
positive effect should always dominate. The reasoning is straightforward. By (22), x
could fall if and only if learning productivity k (n) has fallen. The assumed increase in
η represents an exogenous improvement in the learning technology, which may lead to
an equilibrium decline in n in case ε > 1. The effect of such an equilibrium response
should not more than offset the effect of the initial exogenous change that has caused
the decline in the first place.
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Behind the simple conclusion that improvements in the technology of communica-
tions always result in greater overall learning investment are important differences in
how the increase in investment comes about between the two regimes of whether ε is
below or above 1.
Proposition 3 (a) In case ε ≤ 1, personal learning investment xP is increasing in
η if
f 0 (n)2
f (n)
− f 00 (n) ≥ 0. (26)
(b) In case ε ≥ 1, impersonal learning investment xI is increasing in η. Further
in case ε > 1, personal learning investment xP is decreasing in η if in equilibrium
dn/dη < 0.
When the two kinds of learning investment are not substitutes (ε ≤ 1), there would
be a larger city to follow the increase in η, in which case the worker should only find it
optimal to raise xP .11 When the two kinds of investment are relatively substitutable
(ε ≥ 1), after the same exogenous change, perhaps at the expense of xP , the worker
would first for sure find it optimal to increase xI . If there is also a smaller city in
equilibrium, the increase in xI is indeed partially achieved by reducing time on xP .
One case not covered by the proposition is how xI should behave in case ε <
1. There should be two effects. The improvement in the technology of impersonal
learning tends to induce the worker to increase xI . In the mean time, given the two
kinds of investment are complements, the worker also wishes to raise xP . This increase
in xP could possibly be at the expense of xI . Figure 2 illustrates via a numerical
example how the direct positive effect dominates at small η but the indirect negative
effect dominates at larger η.12
11The condition for this result to hold (26) is sufficient but not necessary, and in any case is a
rather weak restriction. Because k (n)1/ε−1 f (n)1/ε−1 < 1 but 1/ε ≥ 1 in case ε ≤ 1, the condition
is neither stronger nor weaker than (14) .
12This example assumes f (s) = 1 + sφ, φ = 0.6, ω = 0.1, δ = 0.98, α = 2.2, and ε = 0.8.
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Fig. 2. Personal vs Impersonal Learning Investments, ε < 1.
2.8 Long—run growth
Since both x and k (n) are increasing in η, the growth rate of output :
At+1
At
= 1 + k (n) x,
should only rise in tandem. How that additional growth is achieved, however, differs
between the two regimes of whether ε is below or above 1. In the first case, there
is greater agglomeration of production, and workers tend to spend more time on
personal and possibly less on impersonal learning. In the second case, the city could
shrink in size, whereby workers would raise impersonal at the expense of personal
learning investments.
2.9 Alternative assumptions on commuting
In closing, it would be instructive to examine how the analysis would be affected
under the more usual assumption in urban models that the inputs to commuting are
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supplied by the same agent who demands the commuting.
Consider first the most often adopted assumption that it costs an agent a certain
number of units of her own output to travel one unit distance. In this case, the
congestion cost of agglomeration would just stay constant over time. In a dynamic
urban model, where the returns to agglomeration grow at the rate of productivity
increase, the city would grow in size in parallel to the productivity growth. In this
environment, the analysis of how equilibrium city size behaves with respect to changes
in the technology of communications would be considerably more involved than the
same analysis in which equilibrium city size stays constant over time.
An apparently benign alternative is to assume that commuting cost is in terms of
time lost to production, in which case the congestion cost of agglomeration could well
grow with the returns to agglomeration. The problem with this assumption is that,
unless the monopoly developer assumption is literally true, and that the city planner,
as a landlord, can observe the productivity of each household—worker and commit to
take—it—or—leave—it offers, a symmetric equilibrium under which each worker’s human
capital grows at the same rate cannot be sustained. The arguments run like the
following: Suppose all but one worker have chosen to attain the same productivity
level, equal to say At+1, in the upcoming period. Assuming, without loss of generality,
that it takes 1 unit of time to commute 1 unit distance, the equilibrium rent function
in the period would be given by
ht+1 (d) = At+1 (bt+1 − d) . (27)
If the worker in question shall a attain a productivity level At+1 < At+1, it would
be optimal for her to reside just at the city’s border, paying zero rent and incurring
bt+1At+1 as the opportunity cost of commuting. If the worker instead chooses to
attain At+1 = At+1, she would be indifferent among any locations d ≤ bt+1 as she
pays the same location cost equal to bt+1At+1 anywhere in the city. For At+1 ≤
20
At+1 then, the worker’s location cost is given by bt+1At+1. But should the worker
decide to attain some At+1 > At+1, with the rent function given by (27) , the worker
would find it optimal to reside just at d = 0, incurring a location cost equal to
bt+1At+1 < bt+1At+1. Thus, there would be a kink in the worker’s payoff function at
At+1 = At+1, giving rise to a discontinuity in the first order condition, from which
it follows that the worker’s optimal At+1 can never occur at At+1.13 A symmetric
equilibrium fails to exist as a result. Further, in the social optimum, workers locating
differently should indeed invest differently: The time that remains after commuting
for workers cannot be identical when they locate differently. Then the returns on
human capital investment would also differ among workers. While equilibrium and
optimum asymmetries are interesting in their own rights, they are beyond the scope of
this paper. And again the analysis of how equilibrium city size behaves with respect
to changes in communications technology would be considerably more involved in
such an environment.
13If the monopoly developer assumption is literally true, and that the developer can observe
each worker’s productivity in the housing market and commit to take—it—or—leave—it offers, it would
charge a worker whose productivity is equal to At+1 a rent of At+1 (bt+1 − d) for location d. The
worker’s location cost is then equal to At+1bt+1 at any levels of At+1. But such assumptions are
probably not plausible. True, an essential element in the publicly—supplied commuting setup I adopt
in this paper is that each worker’s productivity is observable to the transit authority in the labor
market. Otherwise, a worker’s wage rate in the urban transportation sector needs not be identical
to the worker’s productivity in the good sector. Still it seems much more agreeable to assume that
a worker’s productivity is observable in the labor market than to assume that it is observable in the
housing market.
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3. CROSS—SECTOR SPILLOVERS AND INDUSTRIAL DIVERSITY
3.1 Learning in a multi—sector economy
In this section, I extend the analysis to study how urban industrial diversity is
determined together with city size in a multi—sector economy. To begin, assume that
now the consumption good can be produced via a continuum of technology, indexed
by j ∈ [0, 1], where each technology is identified as a distinct sector. Each worker’s
human capital is assumed to be specific to one such technology only.
In this economy, each city may host one, two, or just any number of sectors. In
the absence of cross—sector spillovers though, in equilibrium, there would not be
multi—sector cities. Adding a sector to a city raises the city’s population and thereby
the congestion cost of agglomeration. With no benefits to counteract the increased
congestion cost, the city is unambiguously a less desirable place to learn and to
produce.14 In the presence of cross—sector spillovers in learning, however, whereby
a sector j worker may learn from workers in other sectors, in addition to learning
from her peers in the same sector, there could well be room for a multi—sector city
equilibrium.
Specifically, let kijt represent the sector j knowledge capital that city i workers can
access in human capital investment. It is simplest to consider a symmetric configu-
ration in which the productivity of learning investment in city i is given by a CES
aggregate of the sectoral and city specific knowledge capital stocks :
kit =
µZ 1
0
k
σ−1
σ
ijt dj
¶ σ
σ−1
, (28)
where σ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between the knowledge capitals drawn
from any two sectors. In parallel with the setup in the last section, assume that
kijt =
µh
Aijtf (sijt)
i ε−1
ε +
h
Ajtη
i ε−1
ε
¶ ε
ε−1
, (29)
14See Duranton and Puga (2004) and Abdel-Rahman and Anas (2004) for more discussion.
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where Aijt and Ajt represent, respectively, the average human capital of sector j
workers in city i and the economywide average human capital of sector j workers,
and sijt the mass of sector j workers residing in city i. Then the city’s population is
nit =
Z 1
0
sijtdj.
Implicit in (28) and (29) is the same dichotomy between learning through im-
personal means of communications and through personal interactions. That is, if a
sector, say j, is not present in city i, the city’s workers may only learn from sector j
workers elsewhere in the economy through impersonal means of communications. On
the other hand, if there are sufficiently many sector j workers residing in city i, the
learning investment may also be facilitated by the physical interactions with these
workers.
In case Aijt = Ajt = At, and further if each sector present in the city is of the same
size, given by sijt = sit, (28) specializes to
kit = At
µ
nit
sit
k (sit)
σ−1
σ +
µ
1− nit
sit
¶
κ
σ−1
σ
¶ σ
σ−1
≡ Atk (nit, sit) , (30)
where nit/sit ≤ 1 is the range of sectors the city hosts. The equation of motion in (2)
is henceforth replaced by
At+1 = At + kitxt. (31)
Previously, I assumed that the learning related agglomeration economies would
begin to take effect with the very first worker in the city; i.e., f 0 (n) > 0 for n ≥ 0.
It turns out that with the same assumption in the present environment, the city
developer would always find it optimal to include the full range of sectors in the
city under the respective CES assumptions on kijt and kit in (29) and (30) . Then
there would not be a non—trivial analysis of urban industrial diversity. The simplest
modeling strategy to get around the problem is to assume that f 0 (s) > 0 only for
s ≥ µ, for some threshold µ > 0, whereas f (s) remains equal to 1 for s < µ.
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One possible justification for this admittedly unusual assumption is that learning
from workers of a particular sector facilitated by personal contacts is probably not
possible unless there are sufficiently many of the sector’s workers present, for otherwise
the interactions could just be too infrequent to give rise to any meaningful learning
opportunities.15 ,16
3.2 Optimal time division
The specification of the learning technology in (30) and (31) can be derived as the
outcome of the worker’s optimal division of time among learning from workers in each
sector in the economy, in much the same way (2) and (10) fall out from the worker’s
optimal time division between the two kinds of learning investment in section 2.
Specifically, let xjt denote the time the worker spends on learning from sector j
workers. If the aggregate time investment is xt,Z 1
0
xjtdj = xt. (32)
Assume that in period t the worker’s human capital increases by an amount given by
∆it =
µZ 1
0
[kijtxjt]
ρ−1
ρ dj
¶ ρ
ρ−1
. (33)
Taking the learning environment as given, the worker chooses xjt, j ∈ [0, 1] , to
maximize (33) subject to (32) . If Aijt = Ajt = At, and sijt = sit for each sector
present in the city, the worker would find it optimal to set xjt = xSt for all j in which
15If for example learning takes place through pairwise meetings of workers, the matching of workers
could be subject to some kind of increasing returns.
16Alternatively, one may assume that a certain local public good is an essential input to production
in the city, and that the quantity required is increasing in the range of sectors present in the city.
Then the city developer may find it optimal not to include the full range of sectors in the city,
notwithstanding assuming f 0 (s) > 0 for s ≥ 0. Such an assumption is argubly less plausible than
assuming the kind of increasing returns explained above.
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sijt = sit > µ and xjt = xBt for all j in which sijt = 0, for some x
S
t and x
B
t . Then (33)
reads
∆it = At
Ã
nit
sit
h
k (sit) x
S
t
iρ−1
ρ +
µ
1− nit
sit
¶ h
κxBt
i ρ−1
ρ
! ρ
ρ−1
, (34)
while (32) becomes
nit
sit
xSt +
µ
1− nit
sit
¶
xBt = xt. (35)
Maximizing (34) with respect to xSt and x
B
t subject to (35) yields
xSt =
xtk (sit)
ρ−1
nit
sit
k (sit)
ρ−1 +
³
1− nit
sit
´
κρ−1
, (36)
xBt =
xtκ
ρ−1
nit
sit
k (sit)
ρ−1 +
³
1− nit
sit
´
κρ−1
. (37)
Then (30) and (31) fall out from substituting (36) and (37) into (34), where σ = 1
2−ρ .
3.3 Equilibrium sector size
The city developer’s maximization remains as given by (15) in section 2, except
that the developer in the multi—sector economy also faces the choice of the range
of sectors to be included in the city. Given nit, choosing the range of sectors to be
included in the city is equivalent to choosing the size of each sector in the city, of
which the first order condition reads
− σ
σ − 1
µ
k (s)
σ−1
σ − κσ−1σ
¶
+ sk (s)1/ε−1/σ f (s)−1/ε f 0 (s) = 0, (38)
where I have, without loss of generality, dropped the city and the time subscripts.
Now (38) is simply the first order condition of maximizing k (s, n) with respect to s,
where the left side is indeed diminishing in s given (14) . Further, if
lim
s→∞
sk (s)1/ε−1/σ f (s)−1/ε f 0 (s) = 0, (39)
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there exists a unique solution for s > µ to the equation.17
Given city size, as s increases, the city may only host fewer sectors. With the fallen
industrial diversity, the city’s workers may only be able to learn through impersonal
means from workers in sectors no longer present in the city. But as s increases,
there would also be increasing concentration of workers from the remaining sectors
in the city, allowing the city’s workers to learn from them with greater intensity
and effectiveness. In equilibrium, the marginal cost (the first term of (38)) and the
marginal returns (the second term) are equated, giving rise to (38) . The natural
question to follow up is how the cost and returns to increasing sector size may be
affected by an increase in η.
Proposition 4 In case ε < 1, s is increasing in η if and only if ε < σ. In case ε > 1,
s is increasing in η if and only if ε > σ.
It turns out that an increase in η would raise the returns, as well as the cost, to
increasing sector size if and only if ε < σ. In this event, if ε < 1 as well, the increase
in marginal returns would exceed the increase in marginal cost, yielding a larger s in
equilibrium. Conversely if ε > σ, and further if ε > 1, the decline in marginal returns
would not be as large as the decline in marginal cost to also result in a larger s.
3.4 Equilibrium city size
Where (38) is an equation in s only, equilibrium sector size is completely isomorphic
to city size. This special feature of the model helps simplify the analysis considerably
17With f (µ) = 1, k (µ) = κ. At s = µ then, the left side of (38) starts out equal to
µκ1/ε−1/σf 0 (µ) > 0, and if (39) holds, it ends up falling below 0 as s becomes large. Had we
continued to assume that f (0) = 1, so that k (0) = κ, the left side would start out equal to 0 at
s = 0 and becomes negative thereafter. In this case, k (n, s) is maximized at the corner of n/s = 1;
i.e., the city developer always finds it optimal to include the full range of sectors in the city.
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since in the determination of city size, sector size can be treated as given. Thus given
s, the city may have a population n ∈ [0, s]. As n increases from 0 to s, the range
of sectors included in the city increases from 0 to 1, while k (n, s) rises from κ to
k (s). The equilibrium condition for n, as in the analysis in section 2, can be derived
by combining the first order conditions of (15) with respect to nit and τ it and the
zero—profit condition for city formation :
xk (n, s)
1−σ
σ
σ
σ − 1
k (s)
σ−1
σ − κσ−1σ
s
=
ωα
2 + α
nα/2−1
πα/2
. (40)
The left side of (40) , denoting the marginal returns to agglomeration, is decreasing
if and only if σ > 1 — an assumption that I should maintain for the following. The
appendix shows that
Lemma 3 (a) The marginal returns to agglomeration are increasing in η if ε < 1 <
σ. (b) The marginal returns would decline if ε > σ > 1.
Next, rewrite (40) as
xD (n, s) =
ωα
2 + α
nα/2−1
πα/2
k (n, s)
σ−1
σ sµ
k (s)
σ−1
σ − κσ−1σ
¶ σ − 1
σ
, (41)
— a strictly increasing, and unbounded function of n that starts out equal to 0 at
n = 0, the counterpart of (19) for the single—sector economy.
Equation (22) that relates how the worker’s optimal x depends on n remains valid,
except that k is replaced by k :
xW (n, s) ≡ 1
1 + δ
"
δ − 1− δ
k (n, s)
#
, (42)
while the claims of lemma 2 continue to apply with some minor modification.
Lemma 4 xW (n) is strictly increasing, strictly concave if σ > 1/2, bounded by (23) ,
and positive over n ≥ 0 if (24) holds.
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The two functions (41) and (42) are the counterparts of (19) and (22), respectively,
for our previous analysis of the single-sector economy. In the present analysis, an
interior symmetric constant growth equilibrium can be defined as a n ∈ (0, s) that
solves xD (n, s) = xW (n, s), where s is the solution to (38) . Such an equilibrium
exists if xW (0, s) > xD (0, s) and xD (s, s) > xW (s, s) . The first condition can easily
be shown to hold given (24) . Whether the second condition holds depends on the
value of s at which xD and xW are evaluated. I should just proceed by assuming that
the condition holds rather than to dwell on the details, in which case :
Proposition 5 Given the existence of an interior equilibrium in the multi—sector
economy, the equilibrium is unique if (25) holds.
3.5 City size, urban industrial diversity, and improvements in communica-
tions technology
To begin analyzing how improvements in communications technology may affect
city and sector sizes and urban industrial diversity, it is useful first to establish that :
Proposition 6 An increase in the productivity of learning through impersonal means
of communications η raises equilibrium city size n if ε ≤ 1 < σ.
The claim of proposition 6 is almost identical to the claim of proposition 2(a).
The novelty in the extension to studying a multi—sector city equilibrium is that it
allows an analysis of how urban industrial diversity; i.e., the range of sectors hosted
in each city n/s, behaves with respect to changes in the learning environment. Table
1 summarizes the claims of propositions 4 and 6. Because the analysis is restricted
to where σ > 1, there are just three mutually exclusive possibilities to consider.
28
Table 1 : Comparative steady state of η
sector size city size urban industrial diversity
∂s/∂η ∂n/∂η ∂ (n/s) /∂η
1. ε ≤ 1 + + ?
2a. 1 < σ < ε + ? ?
2b. 1 < ε < σ — ? ?
ε ≤ 1. When the two learning technologies are complements, as a result of the
increase in η, by propositions 4 and 6, respectively, the city and each of the sector it
hosts get larger at the same time. Then urban industrial diversity as measured by n/s
may increase or decline. Even though no firm analytical conclusions may be derived,
there is good reason to believe that n/s should change in the same general direction
as how n and s would change. If it pays to increase city size and the size of each
sector in the city because of the increase in the marginal returns to agglomeration,
it should pay to having more sectors located in the city too, for this serves the same
purpose of taking advantage of the increase in the marginal returns to agglomeration.
Figure 3 illustrates this tendency via a numerical example.18
1 < σ < ε. By proposition 4, if η increases, s increases too in equilibrium. Although
proposition 6 does not cover how n would be affected, lemma 4 does establish that
the marginal returns to agglomeration would fall in this case. In various numerical
experiments, I find that, not surprisingly, for sufficiently large η, following the decline
in the marginal returns to agglomeration, n must fall in equilibrium. Granted that
there is a larger s in the mean time, the ratio n/s declines as a result.
18This and the next example assume f (s) = 1 + (s− µ)φ , where φ = 0.6 and µ = 1. For this
example, α = 3.5, ε = 0.65, σ = 1.3, ω = 0.16, and δ = 0.98.
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Fig. 3. Urban industrial diversity; ε ≤ 1
Fig. 4. Urban industrial diversity; σ > ε > 1
30
1 < ε < σ. By proposition 4, if η increases, there would be a smaller s in equilibrium.
But this case is not covered by either lemma 4 nor proposition 6. To check how the
marginal returns to agglomeration and indeed equilibrium city size would be affected
by an increase in η, I resort to a numerical example. Figure 4 illustrates one typical
instance of how n and n/s would be affected by the increase in η.19 Where the two
kinds of learning investment are substitutes, not surprisingly, these two variables are
found to follow similar downward trends.
Summing Up When city size and urban industrial diversity are jointly determined,
the two variables tend to move in the same direction with respect to advances in
communications technology. In case the two kinds of learning investment are comple-
ments, city size, sector size, and urban industrial diversity tend to increase together.
In case the two kinds of learning investment are substitutes, city size and urban
industrial diversity tend to fall together.
4. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
4.1 Industrial policy
In the multi—sector economy, implicit in the city developer’s maximization is also a
choice of a particular set of sectors to be included in the city. Which set is unimportant
under the symmetry assumption on the learning technology given in (28). Still, for
the city to offer its residents the planned learning environment, its population has to
be comprised of exactly s workers from each of the chosen sectors. On the contrary,
given symmetry, workers are indifferent among which cities to stay in equilibrium.
The problem that arises then is that an incentive compatible sorting mechanism to
coordinate workers to move to their rightful locations appears lacking.
19In this example, α = 2.2, ε = 1.2, σ = 1.4, ω = 0.1, and δ = 0.98.
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The city developer has every interest to maximize k (n, s) so as to be able to levy the
highest commuting charge and collect the maximum housing rent, while paying the
least subsidy. To this end, once a set of sectors is chosen, the developer could choose
to offer the subsidy only to workers belonging to the selected sectors. This helps
exclude workers not in those sectors from choosing to reside in the city. Besides, the
number of workers in each selected sector who would qualify for the subsidy should be
limited to just the planned sector size. In effect, the developer may control the precise
sectoral composition of the city through actively targeting subsidies to particular
workers. Such practices are widespread among city and regional governments in many
places in the world, and with cross—sector spillovers, they could serve an important
coordinating function.
4.2 The social optimum
How may equilibrium differ from social optimality? Consider the model in section 2
for simplicity.20 Granted that in equilibrium n maximizes per capita output net of the
resources used up in commuting, subject to attaining a certain level of productivity
growth, equilibrium city size should only coincide with socially optimum city size for
a given level of investment. This is a familiar result : In static models of an urban
system, a competitive market for cities would help deliver the first best allocation.21
But the competitive market for cities could not be relied upon to help induce efficient
investment on the part of workers in the presence of external effects.
First in the decentralized equilibrium, the worker takes as given the evolution of
20The statement of the planner’s problem and its solution can be found in an appendix available
for download in http://www.econ.hku.hk/~tsechung. The discussion to follow is equally applicable
to the model in section 3.
21Henderson (1974), Flatters, Henderson and Mieszkowski (1974), Hamilton (1975), Arnott and
Stigilitz (1979), and Henderson and Becker (2000), among others.
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kit in making investment decisions. In equilibrium, kit = Atk (nit). The planner
takes this relation into account. When workers fail to internalize the externality
that greater investment today helps contribute to raising the productivity of learning
investment for all in the periods to follow, they tend to underinvest. Because the
marginal returns to agglomeration are increasing in the level of investment, the city
tends to be underpopulated as a result.
A similar externality is at work in the model of Black and Henderson (1999), where a
worker’s productivity depends on the average productivity of workers in the same city.
But the sense in which the city in Black and Henderson is underpopulated is not quite
the same as the sense in which the city in the present model could be underpopulated.
In Black and Henderson, where the agglomeration economies are static production
economies, equilibrium city size does not depend on the level of investment but only
on the level of productivity. Thus given contemporaneous productivity, equilibrium
city size indeed coincides with socially optimum city size. The cities in their model
are underpopulated in the sense that the levels of productivity are suboptimal.
Unlike the model in Black and Henderson, where equilibrium investment is un-
ambiguously suboptimal, in the present model, equilibrium investment could be ex-
cessive, and cities could become overpopulated because of the presence of a second
externality. Recall that it costs the city developer ωAt units of output to supply
one unit of urban traveling. To recover the expenditure, the developer charges each
household a location cost of zitbαit while subsidizing each household for the amount τ it
in the zero—profit equilibrium. In making investment decisions, the worker takes as
given the evolutions of zit and τ it since to an individual household—worker, by how
much they grow is a function of economywide productivity increase. The planner
takes this relation into account. When workers fail to internalize the externality that
greater investment today helps contribute to costlier commuting for all in the periods
to follow, they tend to overinvest. Such externalities need not be peculiar to assuming
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a public urban transportation sector. In general, such a negative externality would
arise whenever labor is an essential input to the production of a local public good,
for which labor productivity is stagnant — the case of the Baumol’s disease.22
Could these investment externalities be internalized by the city developer via some
particular local tax/subsidy, and does the city developer has incentives to do just
that? Black and Henderson discuss in details two possibilities :
1. the city developer sets up a human capital requirement for entry into the city,
2. the city developer subsidizes the investment in human capital,
and conclude that in theory the answers are affirmative, but their implementations
are problematical, to say the least.23 They then argue it follows that the national
government has important roles to play to subsidize human capital investment. In
the present model, such a policy recommendation is not quite warranted before we
are able to resolve whether equilibrium investment is indeed suboptimal or excessive.
Now suppose we are able to answer in certain that investment is suboptimal, per-
haps from the quantitative analysis of the model under a set of plausible parameters.
The first best intervention is of course for the national government to directly subsi-
dize investment. Alternatively, the national government may choose to subsidize the
provision of urban transportation in particular and in the supply of local public good
in general. This would not only help move equilibrium city size, but also equilibrium
22Baumol (1967).
23The problem with the first option is that it is not clear how an entry requirement in human
capital can be enforced in a free society. Besides, they point out that an individual developer has
incentives to cheat to let in (or in the present model, to deny entry in case equilibrium investment
turns out to be excessive) a marginal household who has not met the entry requirement. The
problem with the second option is that with free mobility across cities, developers have incentives
to “steal” households away from cities that have subsidied their human capital investment. In the
present model and in case equilibrium investment is exessive, developers have incentives to provide
tax asylums to households who are discouraged to invest in other locales.
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investment, closer to optimum, given that in the decentralized equilibrium, workers
would choose to invest a greater amount in the larger city. True such policy inter-
ventions could not be relied upon to attain the first best optimum : Even if each city
is of the optimum size, the investment externalities remain. They could nevertheless
help move equilibrium investment closer to optimum investment.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In academia, we tend to believe that face—to—face and impersonal communications
should always be complements. The better we read up on the relevant literature,
the more fruitful the discussions with colleagues would become.24 The finding by
Kolko (2000) that internet domains tend to be disproportionately located in large
cities perhaps could also be taken to imply that personal contacts and impersonal
communications are complements.
The degree of complementarity between the two kinds of communications needs not
be given and remains at the same level over time though. For example, one way in
which the two kinds of communications could be complements is that often we learn
from others about where information on a particular subject can be found. Such
personal contacts could become increasingly valuable for two reasons :
1. As the stock of knowledge grows over time and becomes increasingly specialized,
we depend increasingly on others as sources of references.
2. When it becomes easier to access publicly available information because of
improvements in communications technology, a certain personal contact could lead
to uncovering a much greater amount of information in the aftermath.
With the advent of internet search engines and related technologies, such com-
plementaries could weaken, however, when technologies gradually come to replace
people as sources of references. An investigation into the microeconomic underpin-
24I owe this observation to an editor of the journal.
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nings of how the interaction between the two kinds of learning investment determines
the degree of substitutability between them could advance our understanding of this
important and interesting question.
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APPENDIX
Proof of proposition 1
To establish uniqueness, combine (16) and (22) :
³
δ − (1− δ) k (n)−1
´
k (n)1/ε−1 f (n)−1/ε f 0 (n)− α (1 + δ)ω
(2 + α) πα/2
nα/2−1 = 0, (43)
to obtain an equation in n only. Equilibrium is unique if this equation has at most
one solution. Differentiating,
D = k (n)1/ε−1 f (n)−1/εΦ+
(2− α) (1 + δ)αω
2 (2 + α) πα/2
nα/2−2, (44)
where
Φ ≡
³
δ − (1− δ) k (n)−1
´Ãµ1
ε
− 1
¶
k (n)1/ε−1 f (n)−1/ε f 0 (n)2 − 1
ε
f 0 (n)2
f (n)
+ f 00 (n)
!
+(1− δ) k (n)1/ε−2 f (n)−1/ε f 0 (n)2 .
The last term of (44) is negative if α > 2; then it suffices to show that Φ is likewise
negative. Now if (25) holds, since k (n) ≥ κ,
δ >
2
k (n) + 2
,
from which it follows that
δ − (1− δ) k (n)−1 > (1− δ) k (n)−1 . (45)
Then
Φ <
³
δ − (1− δ) k (n)−1
´ "1
ε
k (n)1/ε−1 f (n)−1/ε f 0 (n)2 − 1
ε
f 0 (n)2
f (n)
+ f 00 (n)
#
< 0,
where the second inequality is by (14) .
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Proof of proposition 2
To establish (a), totally differentiate (43) to obtain
dn
dη
=
k (n)2/ε−2 f (n)−1/ε η−1/εf 0 (n)
−D
µ
[1− δ] k (n)−1 +
³
δ − [1− δ] k (n)−1
´µ1
ε
− 1
¶¶
.
(46)
First D < 0 if (25) holds, while the bracketed term is guaranteed to be positive if
ε < 1. To establish (b), by (22) ,
dx
dη
=
1− δ
1 + δ
k (n)−2
dk (n)
dη
, (47)
while
dk (n)
dη
=
∂k (n)
∂η
+
∂k (n)
∂n
∂n
∂η
=
k (n)1/ε
η1/ε
Ã
1 + η1/εf (n)−1/ε f 0 (n)
∂n
∂η
!
=
k (n)1/ε
η1/ε

1−
(1− δ) k (n)−1 +
³
δ − [1− δ] k (n)−1
´ ³
1
ε
− 1
´
f (n)2/ε f 0 (n)−2 k (n)2−2/εD

 , (48)
where the last equality is by (46). Since D < 0, the sign of dk/dη is the same as the
sign of
Ψ = (1− δ) k (n)−1 +
³
δ − [1− δ] k (n)−1
´µ1
ε
− 1
¶
− f (n)2/ε f 0 (n)−2 k (n)2−2/εD
=
(α− 2) (1 + δ)αω
2 (2 + α) πα/2
nα/2−2
f (n)2/ε
f 0 (n)2
k (n)2−2/ε −
³
δ − [1− δ] k (n)−1
´
×µ
k (n)1−1/ε f (n)1/ε f 0 (n)2 f 00 (n)− 1
ε
k (n)1−1/ε f (n)1/ε−1
¶
.
The last bracketed term is negative by (14) and thus Ψ > 0.
Proof of proposition 3
By (11) , (7) , and that Ait = At,
dxP
dη
= f (n)1−1/ε k (n)1/ε−1
Ã
dx
dη
+ x
µ
1
ε
− 1
¶
×
38
"
k (n)1/ε−1 η−1/ε +
³
k (n)1/ε−1 f (n)−1/ε − f (n)−1
´
f 0 (n)
dn
dη
#!
=
Ã
f 0 (n)2
f (n)
− f 00 (n) + α− 2
2
n−1
!
f (n)1−1/ε
f 0 (n) k (n)
x
dn
dη
,
where the second inequality is by (46) , (47), and (16). In case ε ≤ 1, dn/dη > 0.
Then dxP/dη is guaranteed to be positive if (26) holds. Suppose ε > 1 and further
suppose dn/dη < 0. Then dxP/dη is guaranteed to be negative if the terms inside the
bracket sum to a positive expression, which follows from (14) . Next by (8) , (11) , and
that Ait = At,
dxI
dη
= η1−1/εk (n)1/ε−1
Ã
dx
dη
+ x
µ
1
ε
− 1
¶"
k (n)1/ε−1 f (n)−1/ε f 0 (n)
dn
dη
− η−1
#!
=
−Dη
³
dn
dη
´2
+ (1− δ) k (n)2/ε−3 η1−2/ε
1 + δ
+ xk (n)1/ε−1 η−1/ε
µ
1− 1
ε
¶
,
where the second equality is once again by (47) and (46) . Then dxI/dη is guaranteed
to be positive if ε ≥ 1.
Proof of proposition 4
Totally differentiating (38) yields
∂s
∂η
=
f (s)1/ε
µ
1−
³
κ
k(s)
´1/ε−1/σ
− sf (s)−1/ε f 0 (s)
³
1
ε
− 1
σ
´
k (s)1/ε−1
¶
sη1/ε
³³
1
ε
− 1
σ
´
k (s)1/ε−1 f (s)−1/ε f 0 (s)2 − 1
ε
f (s)−1 f 0 (s)2 + f 00 (s)
´ . (49)
The denominator is negative by (14). Multiply the numerator by f (s)−1/ε k (s)1−1/σ.
The sign of ∂s/∂η is thus the same as the sign of
Ω ≡ −k (s)
σ−1
σ + κ
σ−1
σ
Ã
k (s)
κ
! ε−1
ε
+ sf (s)−1/ε f 0 (s)
µ
1
ε
− 1
σ
¶
k (s)1/ε−1/σ
= −k (s)
σ−1
σ + κ
σ−1
σ
Ã
k (s)
κ
! ε−1
ε
+
σ − ε
ε (σ − 1)
µ
k (s)
σ−1
σ − κσ−1σ
¶
(by (38))
= κ1/ε−1/σ
µ
k (s)
ε−1
ε − κ ε−1ε
¶
− σ
σ − 1
ε− 1
ε
µ
k (s)
σ−1
σ − κσ−1σ
¶
= κ1/ε−1/σ
µ
f (s)
ε−1
ε − 1
¶
− σ
σ − 1
ε− 1
ε
µ
k (s)
σ−1
σ − κσ−1σ
¶
(by (12) and (13)),
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which vanishes at s = µ since f (µ) = 1 and k (µ) = κ. Differentiating with respect
to s,
∂Ω
∂s
=
ε− 1
ε
f (s)−1/ε f 0 (s)
³
κ1/ε−1/σ − k (s)1/ε−1/σ
´
.
Since κ < k (s) for s > µ, if ε > 1, ∂Ω/∂s > 0 iff ε > σ. Conversely, if ε < 1,
∂Ω/∂s > 0 iff ε < σ.
Proof of lemma 3
First substitute (38) into (40) :
xk (n, s)
1−σ
σ k (s)1/ε−1/σ f (s)−1/ε f 0 (s) =
2ω
2 + α
α
2
nα/2−1
πα/2
. (50)
Totally differentiating the left—side with respect to η, while recognizing ∂k/∂s = 0
holds at where s satisfies (38) , and then multiplying through by
x−1k (n, s)1−1/σ k (s)1/σ−1/ε f (s)1/ε
yields
Θ ≡ 1− σ
σ
k (n, s)
1−σ
σ f 0 (s)
µ
n
s
k (s)1/ε−1/σ η−1/ε +
µ
1− n
s
¶
κ1/ε−1/ση−1/ε
¶
+µ
1
ε
− 1
σ
¶
k (s)
1−ε
ε η−1/ε +
∂s
∂η
½µ
1
ε
− 1
σ
¶
k (s)
1−ε
ε f (s)−1/ε f 0 (s)2
−1
ε
f (s)−1 f 0 (s)2 + f 00 (s)
¾
, (51)
where ∂s/∂η is given by (49) . To proceed, substitute (30) and (49) into (51) ,
Θ =
Ã
f (s)
η
!1/ε
s−1

1−
"
κ
k (s)
#1−1/σ
×


1− [κ/k (s)]1/ε−1/σ
1− [κ/k (s)]1−1/σ
−
n
s
k (s)
σ−1
σ +
³
1− n
s
´
κ
σ−1
σ [k (s) /κ]
ε−1
ε
n
s
k (s)
σ−1
σ +
³
1− n
s
´
κ
σ−1
σ

 .
The above is negative if ε > σ > 1. This proves (b). If ε < 1 < σ,
Θ >
Ã
f (s)
η
!1/ε
s−1


"
κ
k (s)
#1−1/σ
−
"
κ
k (s)
#1/ε−1/σ
 > 0.
This proves (a).
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APPENDIX NOT TO BE CONSIDERED FOR PUBLICATION
The social optimum
In the social optimum, given A0, the planner maximizes the utility of the represen-
tative household :
U =
∞X
t=0
δt ln ct,
subject to
ct = At (1− xt)−
2ωAt
2 + α
n
α/2
t
πα/2
, (52)
At+1 = At +Atk (nt)xt. (53)
by choosing (xt, nt). The value function of maximizing U reads
U (At) = max
At+1,nt


ln

At
Ã
1− At+1 − At
Atk (nt)
!
− 2ωAt
2 + α
n
α/2
t
πα/2

+ δU (At+1)


 . (54)
The first order conditions are
−

1− xt −
2ωAt
2 + α
n
α/2
t
πα/2


−1
1
Atk (nt)
+ δU 0 (At+1) = 0, (55)
xtk (nt)
1/ε−1 f (nt)
−1/ε f 0 (nt)−
2ω
2 + α
α
2
n
α/2−1
t
πα/2
= 0. (56)
Differentiating (54) with respect to At yields
U 0 (At) =
1
At

1 +
"
1− xt −
2ω
2 + α
nα/2
πα/2
#−1 Ã
xt +
1
k (nt)
!
 .
and substitute the result into (55) yields
−

1− xt −
2ωAt
2 + α
n
α/2
t
πα/2


−1
+ δ
k (nt)
1 + k (nt) xt

1 +

1− xt+1 −
2ω
2 + α
n
α/2
t+1
πα/2


−1
×
Ã
xt+1 +
1
k (nt+1)
!!
= 0, (57)
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The optimum solution is a (xt, nt) pair that satisfies (56) and (57). Because the state
variable At does not appear in either equation, the system (56) and (57) is solved by
a time—stationary pair (x, n). In this case, (57) simplifies to
x∗ (nt) = δ

1− 2ω
2 + α
n
α/2
t
πα/2

+ (1− δ) k (nt)−1 . (58)
The first optimality condition (56) is identical to the equilibrium condition (16) .
Thus given xt, equilibrium city size coincides with socially optimum city size. But
optimum investment x∗ (n) differs from equilibrium investment xW (n), given by (22)
in two important respects.
1. In the free market equilibrium, the worker takes as given the evolution of kit in
making investment decisions. In the symmetric constant growth equilibrium,
kit = Atk (nit). The planner takes this relation into account. It can be shown
that if (2) in the worker’s maximization is replaced by (53), in equilibrium,
xD (n) = δ + (1− δ) k (n)−1 ,
would obtain in place of (22). That is, workers tend to underinvest when they
fail to internalize the externality that greater investment today helps contribute
to raising the productivity of learning investment for all in the periods to follow.
2. It costs the city developer ωAt units of output to supply one unit of urban
traveling. To recover the expenditure, the developer charges each household a
location cost of zitbαit while subsidizing each household for the amount τ it in the
zero—profit equilibrium. In making investment decisions, the worker takes as
given the evolutions of zit and τ it since to an individual household—worker, by
how much they grow is a function of economywide productivity increase. The
planner takes this relation into account. It can be shown that if −zitbαit + τ it in
46
(3) is replaced by −2ωAt
2+α
n
α/2
it
πα/2
via the zero—profit condition for city formation, in
equilibrium,
xD (n) =
δ
³
1− 2ω
2+α
nα/2
πα/2
´
+ (1− δ) k (n)−1
1 + δ
would obtain in place of (22) . That is, workers tend to overinvest when they
fail to internalize the externality that greater investment today helps contribute
to costlier commuting for all in the periods to follow.
Derivation of (4)
By (2), (3) reads
Vit (At) = max
At+1
½
At
µ
1− At+1 − At
kit
¶
− zitbαt + τ it + βVit+1 (At+1)
¾
.
Taking first order condition :
−At
kit
+ βV 0it+1 (At+1) = 0. (59)
Differentiate Vit (At) with respect to At :
V 0it (At) = 1−
At+1 − At
kit
+
At
kit
,
and substitute the result into (59) yields (4) .
Derivation of (16)
The Lagrangian of (15) reads
L = max
{nit,zit,τ it,λ}



µ
zit −
2ωAt
2 + α
¶
n
1+α/2
it
πα/2
− nitτ it + λ
³ eVit (At)− Vt (At)´


 . (60)
Taking first order conditions with respect to τ it and nit,
−nit + λ = 0, (61)
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µ
zit −
2ωAt
2 + α
¶
2 + α
2
n
α/2
it
πα/2
− τ it + λ

At+1 −At
k (nit)
2
∂k (nit)
∂nit
− zit
α
2
n
α/2−1
it
πα/2

 = 0. (62)
The zero profit condition isµ
zit −
2ωAt
2 + α
¶
n
1+α/2
it
πα/2
− nitτ it = 0⇒ τ it =
µ
zit −
2ωAt
2 + α
¶
n
α/2
it
πα/2
. (63)
Combining (61)− (63) , while evaluating
∂k (nit)
∂nit
= k (nit)
1/ε f (nit)
−1/ε f 0 (nit) , (64)
using (10) yields (16) . Finally the first order condition of (60) with respect to zit :
n
1+α/2
it
πα/2
+ λ
µ
nit
π
¶α/2
= 0
is satisfied at any zit with λ given by (61) . In this case, given nit, τ it and zit jointly
satisfy (63) .
Proof of lemma 1
Differentiating the left—side of (16) with respect to η yields
x
1− ε
ε
k (n)2/ε−2 η−1/εf (n)−1/ε f 0 (n) >
<
0 iff ε<
>
1.
Proof of lemma 2
Differentiate (22) with respect to n:
∂xW (n)
∂n
=
1− δ
1 + δ
k (n)1/ε−2 f (n)−1/ε f 0 (n) > 0. (65)
Further differentiating with respect to n yields a negative expression by (14) . Thus,
(22) is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function of n. Differentiating the left
side of (22) with respect to η yields
∂xW (n)
∂η
=
1− δ
1 + δ
k (n)1/ε−2 η−1/ε > 0.
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Derivations of (38) and (40)
The Lagrangian for the profit maximization remains given by (60), except that kit is
replaced by kit. In this case, maximizing (60) with respect to sit is simply maximizing
k (nit, sit) with respect to sit. Evaluating the partial derivatives using (30) yields (38) .
As in the derivation of (16) , (40) is obtained by combining the first order conditions
of (60) with respect to nit and τ it and the zero-profit condition (63) , except that
∂k (nit) /∂nit in (62) is replaced by ∂k (nit, sit) /∂nit.
Proof of lemma 4
Differentiate (42) with respect to n :
∂xW
∂n
=
1− δ
1 + δ
k (n, s)1/σ−2
σ
σ − 1
k (s)
σ−1
σ − κσ−1σ
s
Differentiate further :
∂2xW
∂n2
=
1− δ
1 + δ
µ
1
σ
− 2
¶
k (n, s)2/σ−3

 σ
σ − 1
k (s)
σ−1
σ − κσ−1σ
s


2
< 0,
where σ > 1/2.
Proof of proposition 5
Substitute (42) into (40) to obtain an equation in n only :
δ − (1− δ) k (n, s)−1
1 + δ
k (n, s)
1−σ
σ
σ
σ − 1
k (s)
σ−1
σ − κσ−1σ
s
=
2ω
2 + α
α
2
nα/2−1
πα/2
. (66)
Since the right side is increasing in n, the equation has at most one solution if the
left side is decreasing in n. If (25) holds, the condition follows, as can be established
by straightforward differentiation.
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Proof of proposition 6
Given ε ≤ 1 < σ, by lemma 3, the term
k (n, s)
1−σ
σ
σ
σ − 1
k (s)
σ−1
σ − κσ−1σ
s
in (66) , denoting the marginal returns to agglomeration normalized by x, is increasing
in η. Further,
xW (n, s) =
δ − (1− δ) k (n, s)−1
1 + δ
in (66) is likewise increasing in η since by lemma 4 ∂k/∂n > 0, and then ∂k/∂s = 0
at where s satisfies (38) . Granted that the whole of the left side of (66) is decreasing
in n, the proposition follows.
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